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Chapter 7

.

Partisan Entrepreneurship and Policy
Windows: George Frisbie Hoar and the 1890
Federal Elections Bill
Richard M. Valelly

The rise, fall, and aftermath of the 1890 Federal Elections Bdl demon
strate that entrepreneurial defeat, not just accomplishment, has politi
cally formative effects. Little known and poorly understood because it was
never enacted, the Elections Bill and its history nonetheless carry an im
portant lesson: failure’s repercussions can be pronounced when talented
politicians pushing a transformative idea nearly pull it off—the materia ization of a grave threat to one side can incite an even more radical reac
tion. When Senator George Erisbie Hoar (R-Mass.) led the Republican
Party’s 1889-91 effort simultaneously to revive African American voting
rights and the Southern Republican parties, he built on existing law and
exceptionally favorable (if today obscure) Supreme Court precedents.
Impressed and alarmed by the boldness of his stroke. Democrats struck
back. Indeed, they repealed the Reconstruction-era federal elections
statutes altogether.
• i i
The cycle began in 1888, when the Republican presidential platform
began with a call for “effective legislation to secure the integrity and purity
of elections___ We charge that the present Administration [the Cleveland
Admistration] and the Democratic majority in Congress Uhe House] owe
their existence to the suppression of the ballot by a criminal nullification
of the Constitution and laws of the United States.’’ Then, during t e st
Congress, 1889-91, when Republicans exercised unified control of na
tional government for the first time since 1883, Hoar, a longtime advocate
of black voting rights, coordinated the Republican party’s consideration of
the Elections Bill. The measure implemented Article I, Section 4 of the
Constitution, granting Congress the authority to manage its own elections.
The bill transferred the administration of U.S. House elections from the
states to the federal judiciary, bypassing Southern Democratic governors
and state elections officials.
......................
After House passage on July 2, 1890, the Republican elections initiative
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triggered a Senate showdown in late 1890 and early 1891—a thirty-threeday filibuster—that is still studied for its political lessons. The Democratic
fi ibuster cracked the Republicans’ cohesion, leading a silver Republican
bloc to hijack the floor for a full nine days to enact a silver coinage mea
sure. When Republicans regained control they sought to abolish the fili
buster. But the bill instead died on January 26, 1891, when a silver
Republican exploited the absence from the floor of a fifth of the Republi
can caucus. He adroitly moved that the Senate consider new business, a
motion that carried—after a dramatic delay of several days to verify the
count, which was 35 to 34. Table 1 shows the vote on whether to conLue
debate (that is, to table the motion for new business).^
J^UARY 26, 1891,
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o,nd Northern Republicans, 1860-1910
procedure produced a vote on the “k^latived^.f ofjan-

End of Story? Not quite. Democrats might have moved on to other issues
such as monetary and tariff policy. But they chose differently. Despite the
passage of eighteen months time. Democrats actually ran against the Fed
eral Elections Bill m 1892. The national 1892 platform of the Democratic
party denounced the Harrison administration’s “tendency to centralize all
power at the Federal capital” and immediately turned in the first sentence
of the platform s second paragraph to the policy ofFederal control of elections,
to which the Republican party has commuted itself (emphasis added) warning
that It was “fraught with the gravest dangers, scarcely less momentous than
would result from a revolution . . . establishing monarchy on the ruins of
die Republic. For their part, Republicans did back off a bit, putting the
issue lower m the platform. Nonetheless the GOP platform proclaimed
We demand that every citizen of the United States shall be allowed to cast
one free and unrestricted ballot in all public elections ... the party will
never relax its efforts until the integrity of the ballot . . . shall be guaran
teed and protected in every State.”
The issue of Southern elections administration defined national inter
party conflict m 1892. As matters happened. Democrats gained unified
control from 1893 to 1895 (previously achieved during the antebellum
Buchanan administration.) They promptly used t/i«V window of opportu-
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nity to repeal the federal elections statutes that enforced the Fifteenth
Amendment. A House committee report demanded that “every trace of re
construction measures be wiped from the books.” If the Republicans were
going to trot out a new statute, then Democrats were simply going to get
rid of federal election statutes."*
The cycle that stretched from 1888 to 1894 in the end resembled a
“boomerang”—to use Theda Skocpol’s term from a different policy con
text ® Hoar’s policy entrepreneurship had supremely high stakes. If the bill
had passed-again, it failed by only one vote-then the formal-legal disen
franchisement of Black Southerners might have stalled. Instead, Hoar and
his copartisans touched off a Democratic drive to dismantle the federal
elections statutes—thereby destroying much of what Hoar and many other
Republicans had long fought for. The damage to African American inter
ests was incalculable. Not until the 1957 Civil Rights Act did Congress reen
ter the field of voting rights for blacks.
.,6
How best to dissect this remarkable sequence of political events. My
contribution is to apply John Kingdon’s idea of a policy window, from his
classic analysis. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Politics? The Republican
policy window” from the 1868 through the 1888 presidential elections
shows that the window for Hoar was relatively large. I frame who Hoar was
and what he brought to the Federal Elections Bill, the statutory and judi
cial precursors that augmented its threat to the Democratic party, and the
regulatory scheme it envisioned—built on a system the Supreme Court had
emphatically approved. The impact of the bill on Southern politics alone
would have been zero-sum for the Democratic party, but it had other bleak
implications as well for Democrats. These events illustrate my primary con
cern: what can happen to an entrepreneur’s goals when she or he engages
zero-sum party conflict.

The Size of the Policy Window
To measure Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction policy windows—as
they might have been perceived—I devise two scores (see Table 2). The
first score sums the change \n Republican strength, positive or negative, m
the Electoral College vote (expressed as percentage points), the positive or
negative change in the numerical spread in the Senate, and the positive or
negative change in the numerical spread in the House, and then divides by
100 to yield a figure between 0 and 1. The second score comes from sum
ming the margins, expressed in percentages for the Electoral College vote
and numerical spreads for the Senate and the House, and dividing by 100.
Both measures show that there was a substantial jump m the party s elec
toral vitality between 1884 and 1888. Substantial policy opportunities oc
curred for the first time since Reconstruction.
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Table 2. Republican Policy Windows, 1868-88

Size of change
Size of margin

1872

1876

1880

1884

1888

.64
1.95

.17
-.14

.31
.5

.15
-.43

.52
.57

Source: Patricia Heidotting Conley, Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National
Agenda (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 58-61, table 4.2; Kenneth C. Martis, The
Historical Atlas ofPolitical Parties in the United States Congress 1789-1989 (New York- Macmillan
1989), 127-43.

Who Hoar Was
What personal intellectual and political history did George Frisbie Hoar
bring to this policy window? Although it was not obvious until late in tbe
game, Hoar’s factional influence peaked before the 1889-91 period. High
noon had come for Hoar when he led the Half-Breed Republican faction
that organized the 1880 Republican national convention and influenced
the Garfield-Arthur administration.®
Nonetheless, going into the 1889-91 cycle Hoar was a formidable player.
For one thing, his unswerving support for high tariffs and protection of
home industries—and his slashing attacks on the Mugwumps in 1884__
made it far easier for his colleagues to entertain his preoccupation with
African American rights. Hoar stood for a happy harmony of interests.
Without strong Southern Republican parties, the Republicans could never
really be certain of the regular electoral and legislative m^orities necessary
for tariff legislation and revision. High tariffs, industrialization, partisan
strength, and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement all went together.®
Hoar also knew more than most about election law. He was one of the
House Republican appointments to the special electoral commission set up
by Congress in 1877 to resolve tbe crisis of the 1876 presidential election.
He chaired the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections from 1881
through the 51st Congress. During his Senate career, 1877-1904, he
“served as bill manager for numerous important measures,” including
shepherding the Electoral Count Act of 1887 (the measure that affected
the 2000 election crisis in Florida) across three Congresses.^®
Finally, Hoar never got ahead of his colleagues philosophically. He ex
pressed, and may have actually held, a belief in so-called Anglo-Saxon su
periority. But he also publicly insisted that white status resulted solely from
favorable historical circumstances. Racist feelings were also socially dys
functional: “in all these race difficulties and troubles, the fault has been
with the Anglo-Saxon.. .. The white man has been the offender.” For Hoar,
the whole point of American fundamental law and democratic principles
was inclusion and political progress for all citizens.'^
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Statutory and Judicial Precursors of the Federal Elections Bill
Hoar had yet another major advantage: the availability of potent electoralregulatory tools that could be turned toward the effective protection of
Black voting rights. The conventional wisdom is that all hope for Black suf
frage succumbed to the overthrow of the Reconstruction governments, the
apparent hostility of the Supreme Court to elections statutes targeted at the
South, and, of course, the Compromise of 1877. But m actuality rich possi
bilities for Black voting rights survived.'^

Statutory Foundations

Woodrow Wilson’s Congressional Government unwittingly describes the de
vices that had this potential. Wilson rails against “The federal supervisor
who oversees the balloting for congressmen,” a form of electoral regulation
that for Wilson “represents the very ugliest side of federal supremacy.
This now cryptic literary relic offers a startling window into a
thriving
legal-electoral reality. Federal supervisors? Of House elections. When did
all this happen? Why?
, , .
^
The so-called very ugliest side of federal supremacy had three statute^
foundations: the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1870 and *wo fed
eral elections bills enacted back-to-back in 1871 and 1872. It also had ex
tremely strong support from the Supreme Court, something Wdson di
not mention in Congressional Government. Let us briefly examine eac
statute, and the Court decisions that strengthened these federal laws.
Reacting in 1870 to the largest fraud ever devised in American electoral
histoiT—the production by Tammany Hall of sixty thousand naturaliza
tion papers a month before the 1868 elections in New York state, which
tainted 16 percent of the state’s presidential vote —a Republican Con
gress placed federal elections administration in cities under direct na
tional control with the 1870 Naturalization Act. It criminalized fraud m
the naturalization and citizenship process. Under this statute, federa
judges could also, in response to citizen petition, provide (m cities wit
upward of twenty thousand inhabitants) for bipartisan temporary federal
supervision of elections to the House. In such cities, furthermore. Con
gress authorized the U.S. marshal for the district in which the city was lo
cated, “to appoint as many special deputies as may be necessary to
preserve order at any election at which representatives m Congress are to
be chosen ... to preserve order . . . and to arrest for any offense or breach
of the peace committed in their view.”
Then, in the 1871 Federal Elections Act, Congress judicialized the new
regulatory scheme. Any two citizens of a city with a population in excess of
twenty thousand could petition a federal Judicial circuit for special biparti
san supeiwision of the House election in the district where the city was lo-
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cated. The federal supervisors were authorized to assure that no eligible
person was omitted from the rolls and to strike the names of unauthorized
voters. They were also permitted to assemble and maintain their own reg
istration lists. On election day they and their deputies, as appointed by the
U.S. marshal, physically surveilled the polling places from the time they
opened until they closed, and could personally inspect and count ballots as
they chose. Anyone caught interfering with any voter’s right to vote could
be brought immediately before a federal judge or commissioner.^^
In about two years, then, midway through Reconstruction, Congress es
tablished an electoral-regulatory structure for U.S. House elections in ur
banized districts. It did not operate everywhere; it affected (at most) about
14 percent of U.S. House districts.'^ With the 1872 Civil Appropriation Act,
Congress subsequently extended the urban regulatory scheme to rural
House districts—if only in part. Under Chapter 1425 of the Civil Appropri
ation Act ofJune 1872, any ten citizens of any congressional district could
petition for federal observers (as opposed to the supervisors provided bv the
1870 and 1871 statutes). ®
Jurisprudential Foundations

This largely Northern system of federal electoral regulation received gen
uinely emphatic Supreme Court approval. In ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879), the Court dealt with a case in which Baltimore elections officials
physically prevented federal supervision of the federal elections in Balti
more in the fall of 1878. In ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879), a compan
ion to Siebold, the Court dealt with the prosecution of a Cincinnati city
councilman who flagrantly mishandled ballots in violation of both Ohio
and U.S. law during these federal elections. What the Court did was stunning. it denied writs of habeas corpus in both cases. The regulatory jailing of
state and local elections officials was perfectly constitutional.
To accomplish this breathtaking result, the Court rested these 7-2 deci
sions on a centralizing and muscular reading of Article I, Section 4, of the
Constitution, which states that “the Congress may at any time by law make
or alter” regulations for the “times, places, and manner of holding elec
tions for Senators and Representatives.” Consequently, the Enforcement
Act of May 31, 1870, and the supplement passed February 28, 1871, regu
lated elections of members of the House of Representatives and were an
assertion, on the part of Congress, of a power to pass laws for regulating
and superintending said elections, and for securing the purity thereof, and
the rights of citizens to vote thereat peaceably and without molestation.” In
violating these statutes, the petitioners violated the Constitution.
Several things were claimed by counsel for the Baltimore city elections
judges (or so the opinion said). But all were wrong. The false propositions
were the following: Congress had to completely superintend national elec-
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tions or not at all, since “concurrent sovereignty in electoral reflation
was intrinsically impossible; it could not punish state and local election of
ficers for interfering with federal officials because the former were not re
quired to protect federal interests; punishment of state and local offici
amounted to double jeopardy; federal marshals could not act m states or
cities, because law enforcement was a state and local preroptive; and Con
gress could not require federal circuit courts to appoint elections supemfors, who were executive, not judicial, officers. The opinion for the Court
denied all of these propositions.
Article I, Section 4, had a “natural sense” that was “the contrary of a
assumed by the counsel of the petititoners.” Specifically, Congress cou
legislate as it saw fit, and if that resulted in “concurrent sovereignty then
the “paramount character” of the federal regulations has the effect to su
persede those made by the State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no
farther” The opinion went to on to add, “Let a spirit of national as well as
teal patriotJonce prevail ... and we shall hear no more abo^ the im
possibility of harmonious action between the national and State gove
ments in a matter in which they have a mutual interest.” As for prosecution
of state and local elections officials, the United States had a constitutional
interest in “the faithful performance ... of their respective duties. This nec
essarily follows from the mixed character of the transaction. State an n
tional^A violation of duty is an offence against the United States, for whi
the offender is justly amenable to that government. No official position can
shelter him from this responsibility.” After putting to one side the issue of
double jeopardy, the majority opinion then exploded; “It seems to be o en
overlooked that a national constitution has been adopted m this coun ry,
establishing a real government therein, operating upon
Z
tory and things.” Thus it was “an incontrovertible principle, that the g
ernment of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercise
through its official agents, execute on every foot of ^encan soi the pow
ers and functions that belong to it. . . . Why do we have marshals at all, if
they cannot physically lay their hands on persons and things m the perforLnce of tLl proper duties?” The alternative was to
- *e na.ion^
government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Cofumbia, or perhaps to some foreign soil. We shall bring it to a condition of
greater helplessness than that of the old confederation. As for the ap
pointment of an elections supervisor by a federal circuit court. Congress

could properly lodge that power in a federal circuit court.
The opinion for the Court in
ended on a strongly nationalist note.
“The true doctrine ... is this, that whilst the States are really sovereign as
to all matters which have not been granted to the jurisdiction and con ro
of the United States, the Constitution and the constitutional laws of the lat
ter are . . . the supreme law of the land; and when they con ic
...
,
_____ .anttir,ritv and oblisfation.
laws of the States, they
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It is hard to imagine a stronger endorsement of the federal electoralregulatory scheme than the one which the Court provided. But could these
ideas help Black voters in Southern congressional districts ? If they did not, then
there could never have been a Federal Elections Bill. The missing link is
the remarkable 1884 case ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651.
The case facts were unhappily familiar. Jasper Yarbrough, several kin,
and other white males were involved in a Klan-like conspiracy to intimidate
black voters in a U.S. House election in Georgia. The defense argued that
there was no valid indictment or process under two former pieces of the
federal elections acts (by then placed in the Revised Statutes, per the code
revision of 1874). One section criminalized any conspiracy against a citi
zen’s enjoyment of any right under the Constitution; the other criminal
ized conspiracy to obstruct voting in national elections. These sections of
the code, the defense claimed, were simply unconstitutional.
The defense’s position was legally quite promising. Several Court deci
sions seemed to advantage it. These decisions came from black voting
rights cases that got to the Court during and after the collapse of Recon
struction.^' But in Yarbrough the Court broke free from these earlier cases,
taking its cue instead from the ideas in Siebold and Clarke. The Court in fact
strengthened Fifteenth Amendment enforcement by fusing it to the congres
sional regulatory power contained in Article I.
Speaking for a now unanimous Court, Justice Miller denied the defense’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At stake was whether Congress could
constitutionally protect the national electoral processes that selected repre
sentatives to Congress. Article I of the Constitution gave it ample authority
to do so, and it was power that Congress had repeatedly exercised. “If this
government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents
of other states and governments, each of which is superior to the general
government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its
existence depends, from violence and corruption. If it has not this power,
it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all
republics, open violence and insidious corruption.” To then draw the infer
ences that followed from this point. Miller took two tacks: description of
how Congress always protected federal officers in the conduct of their du
ties, and of how Congress came to protect the elections which gave it form.
With respect to the protection of federal officers. Miller noted that Con
gress early on criminalized “offenses against person and property commit
ted within the District of Columbia, and in forts, arsenals, and other places
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,” but that “it was slow
to pass laws protecting officers of the government from personal injuries
inflicted while in discharge of their official duties within the states. This was
not for want of power, but because no occasion had arisen which required
such legislation.” Miller then went on to trace congressional action to “pro
tect government officers while in the exercise of their duty in a hostile com-
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munity,” touching on federal legislation to strengthen customs enforce
ment in the wake of the “nullification ordinance of South Carolina,” and
legislation to protect enrolling officers who enforced conscription during
.
. . , ,
,
the Civil War.
With respect to congressional protection of the institution s electoral
foundations, Congress had, similarly, “been slow to exercise the powers ex
pressly conferred upon it in relation to elections by the fourth section of
the first article of the Constitution----- It was not until 1842 that Congress
took any action under the power here conferred” (a reference to the fed
erally established requirement that each member of the House “should be
elected by a separate district”). In February 1872, Congress again acted
under its Article I, Section 4 power to require “all the elections for . . .
members to be held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November m
1876, and on the same day of every second year thereafter.” Congress also
required the two chambers of state legislatures to meet in joint convenUon
and to continue meeting until they successfully chose a U.S. senator. Simi
larly, Congress “fixed a day, which is to be the same in all states, when the
electors for president and vice-president shall be appointed.”
Miller then asked, “Can it be doubted that Congress can, by law, protect
the act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who votes from
personal violence or intimidation, and the election itself from corruption
or fraud?” He added that “it is only because the Congress of the United
States, through long habit and long years of forebearance, has, in defer
ence and respect to the states, refrained from the exercise of these powers
that they are now doubted.” But if Congress needed “to make additional
laws for the free, the pure, and the safe exercise of this right of voting, they
stand upon the same ground, and are to be upheld for the same reasons.
Miller then turned to the right to vote—as distinct from the prior topics
of congressional protection of federal officers and federal elections. Could
the right to vote be federally protected? This was an obvious and necessary
move for Miller to make; after all, the Constitution placed the power to set
suffrage qualifications in the states. But Miller emphasized that matters had
changed. “The fifteenth amendment... by its limitation on the power of
the states in the exercise of their right to prescribe the qualifications of vot
ers in their own elections, and by its limitation of the power of the United
States over that subject, clearly shows that the right of suffrage was consid
ered to be of supreme importance to the national government, and was not
intended to be left within the exclusive control of the states. He then
quoted the entire amendment, including Section 2, which reads “The Con
gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Miller thus suggested that the Fifteenth Amendment was part of the gen
eral pattern of growing federal control which he had just described, and
which dated to the United States’ response to the nullification ordinance.
Miller agreed that the amendment “gives no affirmative right to the co -
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ored man to vote,” but then announced that “it is easy to see that under
some circumstances it may operate as the immediate source of a right to
vote.” After giving an illustration involving Delaware (where the Fifteenth
Amendment automatically invalidated the state’s constitutional “whites
only” restriction), Miller held that “In such cases this fifteenth article of
amendment does, proprio vigore [with its own force], substantially confer on
the negro the right to vote, and congress has the power to protect and en
force that right.”
Furthermore, the Fifteenth Amendment affected all national electoral
processes.
This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of African descent.
The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of this right is within the
power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citi
zen, and the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against discrimination. The
exercise of the right in both instances is guarantied by the Constitution, and should
be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary, (em
phasis added)
In a concluding passage. Miller sounded a warning: “If the recurrence of
such acts as these prisoners stand convicted are too common in one quar
ter of the country, and give omen of danger from lawless violence, the free
use of money in elections, arising from the vast growth of recent wealth in
other quarters, presents equal cause for anxiety. If the government of the
United States has within its constitutional domain no authority to provide
against these evils . . . then, indeed, is the country in danger.” Miller ended
by writing, “The rule to show cause in this case is discharged, and the writ
of habeas corpus denied.
It is essential to step back and fully recognize the result: a unanimous
Court ruled that in order to protect the electoral processes that made it a
national representative assembly. Congress could protect the right to vote
of any citizen. Black or white. Congress could therefore direcdy criminal
ize any individualheYvsmor—not just the state and local official behavior of
Siebold and Clarke—that tainted the integrity of national elections. To en
force such criminal law, the United States could constitutionally deploy and
protect federal officials in the states and localities.
In 1888, just before the 51st Congress took up the Federal Elections Bill,
one final signal came from the Court—and it too was unambiguously na
tionalist. In ex parte Coy, a 7-2 majority held that the United States properly
fined and jailed elections officials in Indianapolis and elsewhere in Indiana
for interfering with the U.S. House electoral process. The state and local
elections officials claimed that they were immune from punishment under
the federal statutes because their admittedly corrupt handling of ballots
was intended only to influence the results of state and local elections, not
the House election. The Court dismissed the claim, and it did so on the
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ground that during the elections the state and local elections officials had,
for all intents and purposes, become officers of the United States and were
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.^®
By this point it should be obvious how potent the Federal Elections Bill s
constitutional, statutory, and judicial antecedents were. The first was an Ar
ticle I federal electoral-regulatory system devised by the Republican party
during the Reconstruction. The second was strong Supreme Court ap
proval for this Article I system—approval which it reiterated m 1888, just
before the 51st Congress. The third antecedent was Supreme Court en
dorsement of a conceptual and legal fusion of the Article 1 system to the
Fifteenth Amendment’s implications for the protecuon of voting rights for
African Americans. For some time a majority of the Court had been quite
uncomfortable with federal electoral regulation to protect black voUng
rights that was based on the Civil War Amendments. But the entire Court
appeared quite certain, some six years before Congress considered the Fed
eral Elections Bill, that the United States could criminally enforce the Fif
teenth Amendment against private action in U.S. House elections under
Article I. The possible consequences for Southern election administration
were striking. It is time now to turn to the Federal Elections Bill itself—an
Hoar’s role in its creation.

The Federal Elections Bill Itself
The idea for an elections bill, in Hoar’s mind, dated to the aftermath of the
1884 elections. Hoar determined to introduce some sort of new national
elections bill. Doing so must have meant admitting two things to himself;
that the Supreme Court had broken beyond repair the Reconstruction
elections statutes that directly implemented the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and that previous post-Reconstruction Southern strategies
counting on Southern promises (President Hayes’s approach) or building
independent party movements (President Arthur’s approach)-were insufSpeaking to the Commonwealth Club of Boston on December 27,
1884, Hoar announced a decision to “consecrate” himself to the cause
of erecting a “system of laws, institutions, and administration under
which . . . millions of men will represent the Black race in the manhood
and citizenship of this republic.”^^ During the 50th Congress, the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections, chaired by Hoar, reported on m
investigation into the 1886 elections in Washington County, Texas, which
left three African Americans dead from lynching. In a dress rehearsal or
the epic conflict to come. Democrats prevented a vote on the mam rec
ommendation, “that the Committee on Privileges and Elections be di
rected carefully to revise the existing laws relating to elections of
members of Congress, with a view of providing for the more complete
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protection of the exercise of the elective franchise.” Hoar got to work
anyway on drafting a bill.^®
When the policy window opened during the 51st Congress, the SieboldYarbrough jurisprudence immediately influenced how Republicans ad
dressed federal electoral regulation. It encouraged Hoar and others to take
the implications of Article I, Section 4, to the next step, a fully national ap
proach. Hoar did not start out by building on the regulatory system just de
scribed, but instead worked up a new system of dual registration and
elections for national elections that was initially roughed out by Senator
John Sherman. Many other—particularly Southern and African Ameri
can—Republicans were interested in such a fully national system.^®
The alternative, though, was building on and extending the existing su
pervisory system that so exercised Woodrow Wilson. Worried about admin
istrative feasibility and cost, Hoar and most Republicans soon fell back on
this option. Working with the newly arrived Senator John Coit Spooner,
Hoar abandoned Sherman’s fully national scheme and proposed having
“National officers . . . present at the registration and election of Members
of Congress, and at the count of the vote, and who should know and report
everything which should happen.” Hoar opted, in short, for building on
the existing hybrid system of “concurrent sovereignty.
Elsewhere in the Capitol, the House Republican caucus wrestled with
both approaches, but it too settled on enlarging the existing system of
“concurrent sovereignty.” A lengthy bill, over seventy pages long, was re
ported to the full House by a select House committee chaired by Hoar’s
protege, Henry Cabot Lodge. After brief and tightly controlled debate, the
House passed the Lodge version of the elections bill on July 2, 1890. Every
single Democrat who voted on the bill cast his ballot against it. Only two
Republicans voted with them.^®
When the House bill got back to the Senate, Hoar, as chair of the Com
mittee on Privileges and Elections, took custody of it. He sought to make it
more palatable to his colleagues by stripping out provisions for military en
forcement and the detailed criminal regulations the House had put into
the bill. He also watered down the fee schedule for the supervisors, and dis
pensed with federal juries that would regulate indictment and trial for
bribery, intimidation, and fraud. In his opinion, the end result “was a very
simple measure. It only extended the law which . . . had been in force in
cities of more than twenty thousand inhabitants, to Congressional districts,
when there should be an application to the Court, setting forth the neces
sity for its protection. . . . We added to our Bill a provision that in case of a
dispute concerning an election certificate, the Circuit Court of the United
States in which the district was situated should hear the case and should
award a certificate entitling the member to be placed on the Clerk’s roll,
and to hold his seat until the House itself should act on the case.”^®
This was not quite the full story. Hoar might have added that during the
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51st Congress Republicans had begun a drive to modernize
cuit courts-what eventually became the Evarts Circuit Court Bill of 1891
(in the 52nd Congress.) Remodeling the federal judiciary was certain to
improve the Elections Bill s impact.
,
■ r
Also a chief federal election supervisor would in fact already exist for
each national judicial circuit.^i Qnce appointed, the supervisors role m
regulating the congressional electoral process could be activated by a peti
tion of one hundred citizens in a House district. Regulation by the super
visor was not, in other words, automatic; it had to be activated. Once the
supervisor’s role was set in motion by the citizen petition to the supervisor
the supervisor could then appoint two deputy supervisors, one from each
major political party. Prior to election day, the federal supemsors could
screen registration lists. On election day they could observe the ballotmg.
After election day, the federal supervisors were entitled to offer certifica
tions of the count and of the winner of a House election m parallel with
that offered by state elections officials. These certifications would be for
warded by both sets of officials to a three-person U.S. Board of Canvassers
appointed by the circuit court.
j
If the Board of Canvassers found that a federal certificate agreed with a
state certificate, then a House candidate with congruent certificates would
be elected from the congressional district. If the two certificates disagreed,
the Board would vote on whether the federal certificate trumped the state
certificate. If the Board decided, by majority vote, that the federal supervi
sors’ certificate was more accurate than the state certificate-soinething it
would know from registration and citizenship data previously collected y
the supervisors—then the federal certificate prevailed. The decision could
be appealed directly to the circuit court, and that court had authority to re
verse it But the circuit court’s decision was final whatever the outcome, re
versal or affirmance of the U.S. Board of Canvassers, unless the House itself
reversed the court in hearing a contested elections case from the losing
candidate.
Whatever the precise details of a finally enrolled statute, its purpose
would have been clear: to impose effective federal regulation over all
House elections in the South. Before 1890, the Article I system covered less
than a fifth of U.S. House districts. The shift envisioned by Hoar and other
proponents was therefore huge.^^ The SMd-Clarke doctrine, which pro
tected federal elections supervisors in House districts and allowed them o
operate freely there as law enforcement officials—able to actually sanction
irregularities—could in principle extend to all U.S. House elections.
As a result of Yarbrough, furthermore, federal supervisory officials m the
South would have been able to inhibit and sanction behavior by private cit
izens who attacked black voters as they exercised Fifteenth Amendment
rights. Not only would the supervisors have been immune from arrest by
state and local officials; indeed, the implication of Coy was that these state
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and local officials were themselves federal officials with federal responsibil
ities, if only temporarily. These federal supervisors could themselves arrest
and process private individuals who operated in Southern congressional
elections to intimidate black voters before, on, or after election day.
Finally, challenge in the federal courts to any new system created by the
Federal Elections Bill would face a great obstacle. During the Reconstruc
tion the federal elections statutes that enforced the Civil War Amendments
had been implemented for several years in the South before the Supreme
Court reviewed them. The Federal Elections Bill, in contrast, would be im
plemented after the Court had already reviewed and approved of the plan’s
various components.
In short, the Federal Elections Bill was a very serious proposal. Its enor
mity was heightened, furthermore, by highly dramatic circumstances—
what Kingdon aptly calls “focusing events.” One was the assassination of a
Republican candidate from Arkansas, murdered while collecting evidence
for his contested elections case. Another was the assembly of Mississippi’s
famous constitutional convention for the purpose of legally disenfranchis
ing African American voters. America was manifestly at a political cross
roads.®^

Reconstructing the Reconstruction?
What about the Federal Elections Bill’s result on the ground? What would
it have done to Southern politics? Would it have forestalled Black disen
franchisement, and, if so, how? There are two answers. First, the prospect
of a new federal elections bill had a clear effect before the bill reached the
Senate. Second, we can fruitfully speculate about its possible impact had it
passed and been implemented.
All over Dixie, Republican and independent parties called for fair elec
tions during the 1888 state conventions. In Mississippi, for instance. Re
publicans ran a statewide ticket in 1888, their first since 1875, with former
Confederate general James Chalmers running for governor. The party
ran on a platform attacking the “present State Government” for relying
on a “fraudulent and violent suppression of free suffrage.” The ticket
functioned, more or less, until violence forced its cessation. The party
then issued a statement that “our candidates are not safely allowed to dis
cuss or protest. We refer not only to such well-known slaughters as Kem
per and Copiah. . . . Yazoo City and Leflore, but the nameless killing by
creek and bayou.” Mississippi Republicans thus urged a federal elections
statute.®^
The Alabama Republican party called for a “national law to regulate the
election of members of Congress and presidential electors”; the Arkansas
Union Labor party, representing the Agricultural Wheel, the National
Farmers Alliance, and the Knights of Labor, fused with the state Republi-
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can party and called for the “consolidation of the elections, Stote and na
tional”; the North Carolina Republican party called for protective state leg
islation that would assure “free and just exercise of the elective franchise”;
the South Carolina Republican party asked “Congress to enact such legis
lation as shall secure a fair election at least for members of Congress and
presidential electors”; and the Waco gathering that fused the State Al
liance, Knights of Labor, Union Labor, Prohibition, and Republican parties
of Texas called for a “free ballot and a fair count.”^^
In short, the anti-Bourbon forces anticipated a federal elections bill. Thus,
in Southern House districts, black citizens would probably have quickly or
ganized themselves to petition the federal courts. During and after the Civil
War, when promising political opportunities opened up. Black Southerners
regularly displayed capacities for action and organization through an intri
cate matrix of social networks, associations, institutions, and small business.
The Election Bill’s design invited such self-organization among black voters
and cooperation with Republican candidates and party organizations. That
process would have stimulated the rebuilding of Southern Republican party
organizations."
The protections afforded by the bill would also have brought talented
politicians, both black and white, out of the woodwork. Because federal of
ficials regulated House elections, maintained physical surveillance on
them, kept their own records, and could criminally sanction intimidation
and fraud, the incentives to join the Republican party or the largely white
but pro-voting rights populist third parties—would have been strong. It was
the candidate certified by federal officials, after all-not state and local of
ficials—who would travel to Washington for the next session of Congress.
Losing candidates could certainly launch an election contest. But the bur
den of proof for a contest would rest on them, not on the federally certi
fied winner—and it would have to be carried after an adverse
determination by a federal circuit.^’

What House Republicans Got—^As a Party—Out of the Elections Bill
The Elections Bill had great potential, in short, to recast Southern politics.
There was another vital sense in which the Federal Elections Bill would
have altered the course of Gilded Age politics; it would have increased the
national policymaking capacities of the Republican party. The Elections
Bill would have augmented the Republican party’s policy-making capacities
in two ways. It would have brought back a large number of Southern House
districts for the Republicans. Also, it institutionally relocated the contested
elections process, freeing up legislative time and energy.
To appreciate these two points—(I) that the Federal Elections Bi
meant better outcomes for Republicans in Southern House elections; and
(2) that the bill freed up scarce legislative time for the majority in the
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House—it helps to look more closely at the characteristics of Southern
House elections, the contested elections process, and the conflict between
that process and growing pressures on legislative time and energy.
Panel A in Table 3 shows that Republicans continued to compete in
Southern House elections in the period between the Compromise of 1877
and the introduction and consideration of the Federal Elections Bill. (It is
interesting to note, in panel A, that Yarbrough may have induced a sharp in
crease in the supply of Republican candidates in 1884—all the more strik
ing since the number of Southern House districts increased from
seventy-three to eighty-five between 1880 and 1882.) But as panel B shows,
very few Republicans won House elections.
Table 3. House Races

in the

Former Confederacy, 1878-90

Panel A: Extent of competition

Election

1878

1880

1882

1884

1886

1888

Percent of districts
with competition

85

94

94

91

67

92

Percent of competitive
elections with Republican
candidates

48

76

61

91

52

86

Congress

46th

47th

48 th

49th

50th

51st

Total Southern
Republicans

3

12

9

8

9

14

Percent of all Southern
seats held by Republicans

4

16

10

9

10

16

Panel B: Relative success

Sources: Congressional Quarterly Guide to U.S. Elections (panel A); Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Partisan
ship and Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives, 1789-2002,” Studies in
American Political Development 18 (Fall 2004): 112-35; table 11: “Election Contests and Repub
lican Seats in the Former-Confederate South, 1867-1911” (panel B). States are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ten
nessee, Texas, and Virginia.

What made the Republicans’ lack of success palpably galling was the fact
that about a third of Southern House districts were majority African American?^
Thus the Southern Democratic war of attrition against the voting rights of
Black Southerners—through fraud, intimidation, and violence—cost the
Republican party a great deal. Imagine how Democrats today would react
if, during several presidential elections in a row, the Republican governors
of key, battleground states and their secretaries of state delivered the Elec
toral College to the GOP by adopting irregular administrative tactics. For
the Republicans of the Gilded Age, something rather similar was happen-
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ing to them—to say nothing of black Southerners who wanted national rep
resentation.
„ ,^
^
Republicans were apparently “cheated” of about 15-19 seats per Congress-

or so they could understandably conclude.^® As Table 4 shows, during the
post-Compromise Congresses in which Democrats controlled the House,
that number of 15-19 seats was a huge percentage of the number necessary
to instead give Republicans control of the U.S. House. Small wonder then,
that the administration of national elections in the former Corifederacy
preoccupied Republicans. Indeed, the day after the House passed Lodge s
version of the elections bill, the National Republican (edited by New Hamp
shire Republican Senator William Chandler, the only member of the Sen
ate who knew as much as Hoar did about Southern elections) optimistically
predicted that over half of the ex-Confederacy would become Republican
replacing a dozen Democratic senators and twenty Democratic members of
the House. Undoubtedly this was too hopeful. But the prediction speaks
volumes about Republican expectations.
Table 4. Difference Made to Republicans

by

Southern House Elections

Administration
Congress

46th

48th

49th

166

49

90

50th

GOP “Southern Deficit” as percent of
margin of control exercised by Democrats
in Democratic controlled Houses

190

Source; Jerrold G. Rusk, A Statistical History of the American Electorate (Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 2001), 219, and author’s calculations.

There was a second way in which the Federal Elections Bill would have
helped Republicans. It was not an issue in debate, but it is hard to believe
that no one noticed the matter. The Elections Bill would have meant an
abandonment of any further reliance on the existing contested elections
process—freeing up legislative time at the margin for policy making. Due
to the bill’s impact on Southern elections, that benefit would immediately
accrue to Republicans.
r u
The existing contested elections process had become something of a bur
den on the House by this point.^' Eurther, because so many contests involved
Southern House elections, there was little prospect of the burden becoming
lighter if no change was made. In the 46th Congress, 45 percent of the 11
cases were Southern; in the 47th, 84 percent of the 19 cases were Southern,
in the 48th, 54 percent of the 13 cases were Southern; in the 50th (there were
no Southern cases in the 49th), 25 percent of the 8 cases were Southem^Yet
only about 25 percent of House seats were Southern. Most of the Ume, then,
the politics of contested elections was disproportionately Southern.
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Leading Republicans interested in streamlining the House—principally
Thomas Brackett Reed of Maine, Speaker of the House in the 51st (and
later the 54th and 55th) Congress(es)—were eager for change. Speaker
Reed considered the existing contestation process
a tremendous waste of resources for the committee members, who had to read
thousands of pages of testimony, as well as the House, which had to spend an often
significant amount of time considering arguments and rendering decisions. His
principal concern was the Republican party agenda, which was often put on hold
for contested elections cases. As Reed stated, elections contests “consume the time
of the House to the exclusion of valuable legislation.”^®

Reed was right. Congress was busier than it had ever been by the 51st Con
gress. As Table 5 shows, the overall size of the congressional agenda ex
panded sharply between the 46th and 50th Congresses. In the face of this
conjunction of scarce time and constant elections contests, the Federal
Elections Bill offered a welcome solution.
Table 5. Expansion

of the

Congressional Agenda in the Gilded Age

Measures introduced

Measures enacted

Congress

Years

Total

Bills

Joint
resolutions

Total

Public

Private

46th
47th
48th
49th
50th

1879-81
1881-83
1883-85
1885-87
1887-89

10,067
10,704
11,443
15,002
17,078

9,481
10,194
10,961
14,618
16,664

586
510
482
384
414

650
761
969
1,452
1,824

372
419
284
424
570

278
342
685
1,028
1,254

Source: ErikW. Austin with Jerome M. Clubb, Political Facts of the United States Since 1789 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 47, table 1.18.

The Federal Elections Bill’s Impact on Party Conflict
To sum up, the word “ingenious” nicely describes the Eederal Elections
Bill. It had reinforcing complementarities. In strengthening Black voting
rights, it increased the number of Republicans likely to take seats in every
House—and in doing that it portended more frequent Republican con
trol of the House, and conceivably more frequent unified Republican
control of the national government. By transferring to the courts the
process of handling contested elections cases at a time when these were
frequent, the Federal Elections Bill also freed up scarce legislative time
and energy just when agenda control was becoming a more serious prob
lem for parties-in-Congress. Due to the efficiencies of the Federal Elec
tions Bill, the party likely to make the most of this increase in legislative
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capacity—at least in the short run—^was the Republican Party. Finally, the
federal regulatory sytem that created these changes was likely to survive
judicial review.
In an important sense, though, the bill was too strong. Its partisan impli
cations were not just zero-sum; they were transparently and palpably zerosum. Hoar had devised and championed the party systemic equivalent of
an atom bomb.
Furthermore, in a little-known but vital facet of the whole struggle.
Speaker Reed had shown what the bomb could do. Before his ascension
in the 51st Congress, Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed expected to stream
line House procedure—that is, to impose the famous Reed Rules lower
ing the size of the House quorum—in order to pass the Elections Bill (as well,
of course, as other major pieces of legislation.)^^ Reed’s imposition of his
eponymous reform allowed him to demonstrate why Republicans would
benefit from the Elections Bill. The House GOP had begun the 51st Con
gress with just a one-vote majority. But the House Republican majority
quickly grew once the Reed Rules allowed the Speaker and his coparti
sans to resolve a large crop of contested elections in their favor, thereby
sweeping in a more comfortable majority early in the session. It would
have been hard for rational politicians to miss the obvious lesson of how
Reed smartly increased his majority. The contested elections cases which
Reed rapidly sorted out were overwhelmingly from the South. More than
one of them involved a black Republican candidate running in an over
whelmingly African American district who nonetheless lost to a Democrat
when the state’s governor certified the election. By providing for a judi
cially controlled certification process, the Elections Bill leveled the play
ing field for Southern Republican candidates and their electoral
supporters—thereby obviating the kind of ex post restoration which Reed
so briskly supplied."*®
Reed’s real-time demonstration of what an Elections Bill might do to
Southern House elections enormously raised the stakes for Democrats.
Democrats also came to strongly believe that they had public opinion on
their side. In the 5Ist Congress, Republicans enjoyed a majority of
179-152; in the 52nd, Democrats would enjoy a stunning 238-86 majority,
having crushed Republicans in the 1890, off-year elections. Democrats in
terpreted the House elections as a popular revolt against Reedism meant
to check the entrenchment of one-party government."*®
Under the circumstances, were Senate Democrats to let the Elections Bill
pass (during the imminent, short session of the 51st Congress, after the
1890 elections), then they had only themselves to blame for whatever the
bill did to the Democratic Party. Democratic resistance in the Senate dur
ing the short session was tenacious, coordinated, and relentless. Indeed,
Democrats displayed perfect cohesion during all of the Senate roll calls re
lated to the Elections Bill.*’
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The Elections Bill’s supporters nonetheless fought a remarkably fierce
action, coping ably with the problem of only tepid support from Western
Republicans and hostility from silver Republicans. President Harrison, a
consistent advocate for the measure, lobbied his Senate colleagues. Vice
President Levi Morton, also a supporter, entered the process as presiding
officer, and worked with Rhode Island Senator Nelson Aldrich (who had
taken over for an exhausted Hoar) to abolish the filibuster altogether—
choosing what today, thanks to Senator Bill Prist’s similar interest, is called
“the nuclear option.”^®
Together, Morton and Aldrich actually won a historic vote, 36-32, to abol
ish the Senate rules that permitted a filibuster. But lacking the parliamentary
touch possessed by Speaker Reed, the vice president failed to immediately
clinch the results of the vote, paving the way for the disastrous vote ofJanu
ary 26, described at the beginning of this chapter.^®
Table 6. Senate Vote, January 22, 1891,

to

Abolish

the

Filibuster

Party

Yeas

Nays

Not voting

Total

Republican
Democrat
Total

36
0
36

4
28
32

11
9
20

51
37

Source: Voteview for Windows v. 3.0.3; roll call no. 423, Senate, 51st Congress.

Even the January 26 vote just might have been reversed. A bitter dispute
broke out when silver Republican Senator William Stewart claimed that
the absent Senator Leland Stanford was actually paired with the one-vote
majority. While not a strong supporter of the Elections Bill, Stanford had
previously announced he would vote both for changing Senate rules to
gain cloture and for the bill. The historian Daniel Crofts has shown, in
his unpublished dissertation, that Stewart’s apparently fantastic “inside”
account in his memoir of how he then got Stanford to back him up was
in fact true. According to Stewart’s memoir, he inadvertently learned of a
plan by Aldrich to rush to New York City to get Stanford’s vote. Stewart
accompanied Aldrich on the train to New York, taking pains to treat his
presence as nothing more than a coincidence, but then gave Aldrich the
slip in the middle of the night to take an express stagecoach to Manhat
tan, getting to Stanford’s hotel before Aldrich did. In his memoir, Stew
art wrote, “we met Senator Aldrich at the elevator on his way to visit
Senator Stanford. I told him he was too late.” Had Stewart not “happened
to be in the cloakroom,” and overhead “one of the . . . messengers remark
that Senator Aldrich was going to New York that night,” Aldrich might
have gaine4 Stanford’s vote and thus forced a tie that the vice president
would have decided.®®
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Table 7. Prioritv Index
1868

of

Equal Suffrage
1872

1876

for

Major Party Platforms
1880

1884

1888

1892

0.76
0.85
0.04
0.14
0.89
1.0
0.93
Republicans
0.96
0.00
0.45
0.72
1.0
0.93
0.37
Democrats
Source: Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, comps., National Party Platforms,
1840-1956 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956).

Democrats did not rest easy, though, after the Republican drive col
lapsed. Consider Table 7. Based on a measure devised by Carmines and
Stimson, it displays scores for the parties on the salience of black suffrage
and Southern elections administration.®* The score is calculated as 1.0
minus the ratio of (a) the number of the quadrennial party platform para
graph (counting from the top of the platform) that contains the first clear
discussion of African American voting rights and (b) the total number of
paragraphs in the party platform. The higher the number, the greater the
importance, and vice versa.
As one reads Table 7 from left to right, one sees sharp conflict between
the parties during most of Reconstruction. After Reconstruction, however,
the parties do not match each other in taking the issue seriously, yo-yoing
back and forth. In 1880 and 1884, Republicans hardly treat the matter;
Democrats, in contrast, show some concern over black suffrage and South
ern elections administration. Then, in 1888, Republican concern shoots
back up. But Democrats drop the subject altogether. In 1892, m the wake
of the elections bill crisis. Republicans draw attention to the issue. But here
we get to the outlier in the series: Democrats rocket from 0 in 1888 all the
way up to .96. This is far and away the largest jump in either party for the
entire period from 1868 to 1892.
Such a single-minded issue focus did not emerge automatical y.
Lawrence Grossman has shown that Northern Democrats were racially
moderate before the Elections Bill standoff. Their stance on race relations
was meant to capitalize on the discontent with the Republican Party that
circulated among a small part of the black Republican base m the North
and to thereby attract enough black votes to cost Republicans across a vari
ety of Northern state and local elections. The Southern wing enabled this
Northern strategy by avoiding open rhetorical pressure for white su
premacy. But the Elections Bill brought out full-throated white supremacism among Southern Democrats—not least to break the Populist wave
coursing among white Southerners. The Northern Democrats could fight
the Southern wing’s white supremacist stance, or adopt it. An energetic fac
tion of Northern Democrats pressured Grover Cleveland, the 1892 candi
date, and other racial moderates, to rhetorically line up with Southern
white supremacy. Eager to return to the White House, they complied.
As the elections turned out. Democrats scored very big: they established

Partisan Entrepreneurship and Policy Windows

147

unified control of the national government for the first time since before the
Civil War. Had the racially moderate Northern Democrats successfully resis
ted the intraparty turn to white supremacy, and had the party done as well
as It actually did, the new Democratic administration would very probably
have left the federal statutes alone. But Democrats instead regained unified
control—after 36 years—through making federal regulation of elections
the paramount national issue. The implications for the federal elections
statutes could not have been clearer.
In September 1893, House Democrats proposed to repeal aWof the Reconstruction-era federal elections statues. On October 10, the House
passed a repeal, 201-102. The majority was entirely Democratic; the minor
ity entirely Republican. The Senate did not consider the repealer until De
cember. But on February 7, 1894, the Senate repealed the elections statutes
39-28—and, quite significantly, without a Republican filibuster.^^
That Senate Democrats won a filibuster-free repeal revealed much about
what the Southern Democrats had accomplished by then. The Democratic
majority numbered forty-four, the Republican minority forty. Nevada’s
William Stewart, erstwhile adversary of the Elections Bill, had returned to
the chamber as a “silver” independent. Three Prairie Populists from South
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas rounded out the chamber’s independent/
minor party contingent. So the numbers hardly precluded a filibuster.
Stewart and the Populists would certainly have cooperated with the Demo
crats to try to impose cloture. But a Republican filibuster was quite possible.
Why, then, was there no such obstruction? In his memoirs Hoar supplied
the vital clues:
The last vestige of the National statute for securing purity of elections was repealed
in President Cleveland’s second administration. ... I have reflected very carefully
as to my duty in that matter . . . snch legislation, to be of any value whatever, must
be permanent. If it only be maintained in force while one political party is in power,
and repealed when its antagonist comes in, and is to be a constant matter of political
strife and sectional discussion, it is better ... to abandon it than to keep up an inces
sant, fruidess struggle, (emphasis added)

The point seemed to be that Democrats had introduced an alarming new
uncertainty into national party competition. They appeared willing and
able to indefinitely make electoral regulation
issue in American politics.
The choice for Republicans was clear. They could subordinate all of their
other policy goals in favor of Black voting rights, opting instead for “con
stant . . . political strife.” Or they could call off the fight.
They called off the fight. African Americans were now on their own. Con
struing the new reality in words that must have had his mentor Charles
Sumner spinning in his grave. Hoar later wrote, “So, after [the] repealing
act got through the Senate, I announced that, so far as I was concerned,
and so far as I had the right to express the opinion of Northern Republi-
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cans, I thought the attempt to secure the rights of the colored people by
National legislation would be abandoned until there were a considerable
change of opinion in the country, and especially in the South, and until it
had ceased to become a matter ofparty strife. ... So far as 1 know, no Republican
has dissented from it.”®®
The political progression that stretches from 1888 to 1894 looks very
much like a “boomerang” (Skocpol’s apt term for cycles such as this).®®
Leveraging both Republican interest in a renewal of the party’s Southern
strength and the party’s announced concern over Southern elections and
African American voting rights, George Frisbie Hoar comes very close to an
extraordinary feat; he nearly reconstructs the Reconstruction. Ratcheting
up the conflict, the Democrats respond by placing the issue of federal elec
toral regulation at the very center of national party competition and dare
Republicans to keep it up. Brought to the brink of incessant. . . struggle,
the Grand Old Party backs off.

Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Windows, and Party Showdowns
The dramatic conclusion to the two-party standoff over Hoar’s proposal un
derscored how much rode on the 1890 Federal Elections Bill. Several
things had been in play; the basic interests of the two parties as vote-getting,
office-seeking organizations; sectional conflict and the continuing red glow
cast by the Civil War on national life; the voting rights of African American
voters in the South, and thus the actual status in American political life of
the Fifteenth Amendment; the filibuster and whether it would persist; the
relationship between the federal circuit courts and national electoral ad
ministration; and the consequences of Article 1, Section 4, for electoral ad
ministration. Contrary to the bulk of scholarly opinion, the Federal
Elections Bill was by no means an irresponsible, misguided, or futile proj
ect. Instead, the bill seized and fortified precisely the ground that was still
available to the Republican party for protecting African American voting
rights.®^
As is already apparent, concepts and terms from Kingdon’s classic analy
sis of policymaking clarify this pivotal sequence. Eor Kingdon, policy
change is neither incremental nor rational-comprehensive. Instead, it re
sults from a partly random, disjointed coupling of “three major process
streams ... (1) problem recognition, (2) the formation and refining of pol
icy proposals, and (3) politics.” He adds, “These three streams of processes
develop and operate large independently of one another. When opportu
nity knocks, the kind of action undertaken by Hoar connects these three
streams.®®
Kingdon’s perspective highlights at least two essential things about the
cycle. First, because consideration of the elections bill happened during a
window of opportunity, the effort stood a serious chance of success. In-
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deed, history could easily have turned out differently. Second, and relatedly, because entrepreneurship was the factor that connected the trio of
(1) political change, (2) problem definition, and (3) refinement of rele
vant proposals, George Frisbie Hoar’s considerable expertise and creativity
bore fully on the situation and aroused the energies of many partisan col
leagues in both houses of Congress.
The story also teaches a great deal about the role of policy entrepreneurship when it intersects with sharp partisan conflict. Party divergence plays
little role in Kingdon’s analysis. Instead, he tacitly assumes partisan conver
gence or inaction as constant and background features of policymaking dy
namics. Kingdon treats a party platform, for instance, as “a grab bag of
mostly very vague concerns.” He adds, “While differences between the two
platforms are obvious, and while the agendas of the parties are different
and reasonably clear, the party position could not possibly constitute a se
rious guide to policy making once the party is in power.”®®
In contrast to Kingdon’s premise of party irrelevance, party divergence
and conflict were critically defining elements of Federal Elections Bill pol
itics. Hoar’s plan had zero-sum implications for the party system: one party
would lose; another party would win by as much as the other party lost. The
results were explosive. Hoar’s party-centered policy entrepreneurship had
effects that lasted well beyond the opening of the 51st Congress policy win
dow.
Partisan, zero-sum policy entrepreneurship will feed back into politics,
palpably and right away. All that is in question is the direction of the feed
back—in a forward cycle, toward the entrepreneur’s goals, or in a reverse
cycle that will unexpectedly damage, even tragically postpone, those goals.
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